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Abstract  The complexity and distinctiveness of policy discourse bring a need for methods 
and advice in both specifying and assessing policy arguments.  The paper reviews, links and 
systematizes work in three areas: (1) general advice from `informal logic' on the exploration 
and analysis of sets of propositions that make up broad arguments; (2) commentaries on 
important elements and tactics in policy argumentation in particular, with special attention 
to aspects of `framing'; and (3) proposed methods to specify and appraise whole positions in 
policy argument, including the `logical framework approach' and Fischer's `Logic of Policy 
Questions'. 
 
 
1.  Argumentation and policy analysis 
 
While training in systematic practical argumentation is valuable for almost any subject, it may 
be especially important for policy-oriented work.  Public policy discourse is notably complex, 
and further has important distinctive features, including the need to incorporate value inputs, 
considerations of legitimacy, and assessments of the constraints on public action.  I propose 
that we should not only stress any distinctive components and structures, but emphasize some 
themes that reflect the field's complexity.  These themes include the underdefinition of 
problems and criteria, and the resulting importance of activities of problem formulation and 
closure.   
 There is a temptation in discourse analysis to plunge deep into philosophy and 
linguistic and literary theory.  Yet the test does not lie in the elegance of an abstracted case, but 
in our ability to provide new insights in particular instances, and to develop and convey to 
others some means by which they can generate insights themselves.  Much current discourse 
theory seems of limited use to students of public policy.  Its distinctions do not reflect the 
specifics of our field, require specialist background and become inaccessible to nearly all 
policy analysis readers and practitioners.  Further, while the complexity of policy 
argumentation calls for systematic methods of examination, it limits the value of any generic 
format for analysing all arguments or even all policy arguments.  We have partly to develop 
our own variants of argument analysis.  
 The paper is a brief overview of some tools for analysing and assessing policy 
arguments.  I will suggest that the following - overlapping, complementary, and non-
exhaustive - contributions are useful in analysing and teaching policy argumentation:- (i) 
some general tools of so-called `informal logic' that have been systematized in the past 
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generation; (ii) work that identifies and discusses important elements of specifically policy 
argumentation, and associated tactics, dangers, and stylistic devices; and (iii) methods to try to 
firstly, specify, and secondly appraise, overall systems or structures of policy argument. 
 We need to increase sensitivity, to the definition and handling of concepts, and to 
patterns and types of inference, but also in less familiar areas: firstly, `formulation', the overall 
shaping of extended arguments in complex fields, which involves issues such as the 
specification of boundaries and alternatives; and secondly, `colligation' and synthesis, the 
pulling together of available elements towards a conclusion.   
 
2.  Elements of argument analysis 
 
 Toulmin (1958) and Scriven (1976) suggested that when we try to upgrade practical 
argumentation we must largely look outside formal logic, for that subject has been concerned 
with laws, not maxims or tentative assessments.  It rarely analyses multi-part real arguments, 
but instead generally restricts itself to assessing given, isolated parts or artificial arguments; in 
other words, to quite limited or already clearly ordered sets of propositions, a far cry from real 
wide-ranging policy arguments.  In contrast, Scriven noted that practical argument analysis 
(also known as `informal logic') has two phases: firstly, specifying the content and structure of 
a real, untidy position, and only secondly assessing them.  The first phase is neither trivial nor 
already given to us.  In analysing policy arguments we normally have to spend considerable 
time identifying their components and linkages, before deciding which parts should be 
appraised in detail. 
 Scriven's own format for analysis reflects direct experience in the tangled argumentative 
world of programme evaluation, and deserves attention.  He indicated the following steps 
(which can be iterative) in the process of specification of arguments and positions.  A careful, 
even plodding, approach proves justified here.  The steps help us to look for components and 
structures, but do not pre-empt our findings. 
1.Clarification of meanings (not total definitions but distinctions sufficient to the use-in-
context). 
2.Identification of conclusions (including unstated implications). 
3.Portrayal of structure (the precise connection of premises, inferences and conclusions). 
4.Identification of unstated assumptions (the most defensible  premises needed to make the 
argument complete and consistent).  
 
 Typically it will be worth first enumerating significant propositions and terms (e.g. 
concepts like `efficient' or `fair' may need examination).  One can then construct a diagram or 
set of diagrams to show interconnections in the overall argument (see e.g. Dubnick, 1978). 
  Argument assessment involves criticism of the premises and inferences that have been 
identified.  Criteria here include: (a) (sufficient) clarity; (b) consistency - both logically and 
with accepted facts; (c) scope - i.e. the range of the consistency; (d) simplicity - including 
absence of special pleading; (e) applicability and refutability; (f) comparison with other 
relevant arguments.  This final criterion might appear to unduly extend the scope of 
assessment; in fact it keeps matters more manageable and relevant, by setting practical 
parameters, and making assessment relative not absolute.  It is easier to defend or attack 
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things if they are considered in isolation; but to reject one argument may mean having none or 
implicitly accepting another, and should be assessed in the light of that.  
 
Figure 1 - Scriven's schema for argument analysis 
  
1. Clarify meaning of components 
 
2. Identify conclusions 
- stated 
- unstated 
 
3. Clarify meaning of overall argument 
 
4. Portray structure 
 
5. Extract unstated assumptions 
 
6. Evaluate premises and inferences 
 
7. Consider other relevant arguments 
 
8. Overall evaluation of the argument 
 
  In Figure 1 I summarize Scriven's procedure for specifying arguments, as a flow-diagram. 
 We should distinguish his procedure from the use of flow-diagrams for summarizing already 
specified arguments, as Dubnick suggested and as is increasingly practised (e.g. Cole, 1995; 
Cole, Cameron and Edwards, 1983; Edwards, 1985).  That sort of summary helps in clear 
presentation of a case, but may not force one to study the logic of the connections or whether 
the summary is a good one.  Scriven's procedure emphasises painstaking specification, with 
stages of feedback and iteration, and formalized assessment as well as description.   
 So to assess arguments we must first work out what they say and how.  Even prior to 
that we need to find and identify them.  Stakeholder analysis helps in spotting different 
parties and viewpoints involved in an issue.  Similarly, unless one identifies the positions 
which are being responded to, one may miss the meaning of an argument.  One's initial listing 
of viewpoints may of course be refined during later analysis. 
 
3.  Specification of policy arguments 
 
Many authors list types of element or component in policy arguments.  Pen (1985) noted these: 
(1) Proposed observations - though these may be defective, and are bound to be selective; (2) 
Logical statements; (3) Empirical statements, on relations between observables; (4) 
Methodological statements; (5) Images and metaphors - used for the integration or `colligation' 
of the above elements into `stories'; (6) Value judgements - which could be expressions of taste, 
or truly judgements; (7) Policy recommendations - which are produced by a further stage that 
Pen calls super-colligation, pulling together values and facts towards normative conclusions. 
 What we need besides such lists is a way to look at how elements function and connect 
within an argument as a whole.  Toulmin's `The Uses of Argument' (1958) gave something 
  
 
 4 
more helpful here than the classical syllogism, and has been applied in later policy analysis 
theory and cases (e.g. Mason & Mitroff, 1981).  Classical logic's focus on determinate inference 
mean that it is less relevant for us than jurisprudence, which has non-definitive conclusions, 
exceptions to rules, and so on.  Toulmin thus spoke of `warrants', which support a belief but 
do not deductively oblige it.  He also added to the standard syllogism the categories of 
`qualifier' and `rebuttal', and distinguished between `grounds' and `warrants' as types of 
premise.  Grounds are (purportedly) factual statements, whereas warrants are the 
considerations used to move from these empirical particulars towards a conclusion.  Warrants 
in turn require backing of some sort.  Figure 2 shows a modified variant of the format adapted 
by Dunn (1981, 1993a) for policy analysis. 
 
 Figure 2 - Toulmin-Dunn schema for specifying policy arguments 
 
Given 
Data/GROUNDS          CONCLUSION 
(policy-relevant              (policy proposal 
information)   Therefore        QUALIFIER   / CLAIM) 
    (inference) (modulates strength of            
         the conclusion) 
  And Since     
  WARRANT              Unless  
(justification for the inference)       -__________________ REBUTTAL to 
warrant / its 
backing / claim 
        
 
   Because               Because 
  BACKING for warrant            BACKING for rebuttal 
 
 
 The format illustrates that arguments have structures, and gives one generalized picture 
of structure.  It is a tool for looking at any case presently at issue, but not a universally 
sufficient pattern. 
 Toulmin et al (1979) use it to show how the character of `grounds', `warrants' and so on 
vary between fields.ii  Even within one field there are various types of warrant.  For policy 
analysis, Dunn (1981) illustrates the use of each of: i) authority; ii) insight, judgement and 
intuition; iii) established analytical methods; iv) standard general propositions; v) pragmatic 
comparisons with other cases; vi) ethics.  An exercise for students is to look for the types of 
warrant, as well as of backings, grounds etc., in a selected study or report. 
 Goldstein (1984) confirms how eclectic are the warrants and backings used in arguments 
in planning.  This reflects its inter-disciplinary history and tasks, and the need to combine 
empirical and normative considerations.  In drawing inferences from grounds (data about 
current or projected situations, such as about needs and preferences), the warrants used can 
include positive theories, normative theories about appropriate allocations or procedures, and 
existing laws.  Their proposed backing may include views on method, broad positive and 
normative conceptions of man and society, the legal constitution, established professional 
approaches, and so on.iii 
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 Toulmin and Dunn's format remains too simple to be a complete layout for arguments.  
`Grounds' may themselves need backing; there can be several types and layers of warrants 
and backing; and discourses contain whole sets of propositions.  Nor is the format a full 
procedure for analysing arguments to identify their detailed structures.  There is a danger that 
after students learn it they try to force everything into a single straitjacket, and become 
diverted from analysing the particular features of an argument.  One must stress that it is just a 
starting point.iv 
 Toulmin-Dunn provide a way of looking at a particular proposition or well-knit set of 
propositions, that is more relevant than the standard syllogisms in logic texts, though those 
still offer us something important.  One cannot however analyse complex policy positions or 
debates in the way one can dissect a single page or poem; one must be selective.  From Scriven 
and others we have some advice for analyzing the more extended sets of propositions that 
make up broad arguments.  What we require are approaches that combine the insights of 
Toulmin-Dunn and Scriven, and then more thoroughly connect them to key particulars of the 
policy analysis field.   
 One helpful proposal is Hambrick's `Guide for the Analysis of Policy Arguments' (1974), 
which probes further the nature of warrants, backings, rebuttals and qualifiers in policy 
arguments.  It tries to identify the types of premise involved in any claim that a policy 
measure will lead to desired impacts and be worthy of support.  Such a proposition involves a 
combination, explicit or implicit, of cause-effect claims and normative claims.  This is obvious 
(though not highlighted in Dunn's format, which simply re-labelled Toulmin's format devised 
for any type of argument).  Hambrick adds other categories: (a) `grounding propositions', i.e. 
intellectual background (not the same as Toulmin-Dunn's `grounds'); (b) `time-place 
propositions', i.e. the context of application for the proposed claims; (c) `constraints 
propositions', i.e. claims about feasibility; and (d) comparison with alternatives.  We will look 
further at alternatives, constraints and `grounding' in a subsequent section.  
 In Figure 3 I take Hambrick's guide beyond a list of elements, by putting it in a 
diagrammatic sequence.  In Stage 1 an initial if-then proposition draws on positive data and 
warrants, and on grounding warrants and backings from theory and methodology (as do 
other propositions).  In Stage 2 normative warrants and backing turn the if-then proposition 
into a means-ends proposition, which in Stage 3 is tested by a number of possible rebuttals 
(e.g. whether there are better alternatives available), to see how far it is sustainable as an action 
proposal. 
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 Figure 3 - Hambrick's categories for the structure of policy arguments, in a flow-diagram 
 
Stage 1 - Cause-Effect Propositions 
 
Causal proposition           
(about impact on a          Grounding propositions 
target variable) 
            (also to other propositions) 
Instrumental 
propositions 
(extending cause-effect 
chains back to a policy      
instrument)   
     If-then 
          (action-impact) proposition 
 
Stage 2 - Means-Ends  
 
Normative 
propositions 
           Means-ends 
   (action - valued impacts) proposition 
 
Stage 3 - Tests 
            Time-place propositions 
Constraints          (concerning contextual 
propositions           relevance) 
 
Comparative          External impact 
propositions          propositions (about other 
            impacts, esp. undesired) 
    POLICY ACTION PROPOSAL 
 
Hambrick's main distinctive stress is thus on what I have called Stage 3, the testing of a means-
ends proposition in various ways.  Two other increasingly well-known approaches focus 
somewhat differently: the `logical framework' approach elaborates the cause-effect chain in 
Stage 1; and Taylor's model of normative argument, as applied by Fischer (1980) to policy 
arguments, goes deeper into the normative backing in Stage 2, and can be used similarly to 
examine grounding propositions.  Both models however represent to some extent similar 
elements as in Hambrick's guide.  We can consider them in turn. 
 
 The `logical framework approach' (LFA or `logframe') in project analysis was developed 
around 1970 for USAID, and has since been adopted by most of the major official international 
aid agencies.  It attempts: (i) to distinguish various levels of project objectives, starting with 
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inputs, through to those about eventual or broader development impacts; (ii) to specify and 
check the causal linkages between the different levels; (iii) to identify the assumptions about 
the other factors that are needed for the connections between the different levels to be valid; 
and (iv) to specify means of measuring the degrees of fulfilment of the various levels of 
objectives.  Elements (i), (ii) and (iii) concern us here.  They try to indicate the sequence and 
structure of argument implied in a project or project proposal.   
 The original USAID version has four levels of objectives (Inputs-Outputs-Purpose-Goal). 
 The project's argument has to be put in the following form (see e.g. Coleman, 1987):  
1. If the specified Inputs are provided and the specified Assumptions (notably about 
important conditions external to the project which could interfere with achievement of 
the Outputs) are fulfilled, then the specified Outputs will be achieved;  
2. if the specified Outputs are present and a second set of specified Assumptions are fulfilled, 
then the specified Purpose will be achieved; and  
3. if the specified Purpose is achieved and a third set of specified Assumptions are fulfilled, 
then the specified Goal will be achieved. 
 Assumptions analysis in LFA clearly corresponds to the `Unless' clauses in Toulmin-
Dunn, and to stage 3 in Hambrick's format, the testing of a means-ends proposition; but the 
logframe format does not include a built-in set of questions to support this analysis.  Many 
authors observe how, for this and other reasons, the assumptions column is typically 
completed perfunctorily and unhelpfully.v  Similarly the objectives column is frequently 
confused and arbitrary.  Many completed logframes thus have an appearance of logic but lack 
the substance.  The increasingly popular GTZ (German) version, which rejoices in the acronym 
ZOPP, is more useful.  It distinguishes five levels, while reducing the degree of stress on 
means of measurement; but the relevant difference here is that it specifies the project's chain of 
means-ends links by first undertaking a problem analysis to establish a chain (or branching 
`tree'-diagram) of hypothesized cause-effect links.  The problem analysis gives a reasoned, 
non-arbitrary basis for the logframe's means-ends hierarchy. 
 Compared to Hambrick's guide, the LFA gives a more concrete means-ends format, but 
often less advice on how then to proceed with the analysis.  Hambrick offers more in the way 
of procedure, questions and categories. The two approaches are thus fairly complementary.   
 
Fischer's model involves 12 groups of questions implied in policy arguments (Box 1).  The 
twelve are themselves grouped into four levels derived from Taylor (1961), moving up from 
(1) technical analysis in terms of given objectives, to (2) assessing the objectives in terms of 
available policy goals, to (3) assessing the goals in terms of accepted social ideals, and finally 
to (4) assessing the ideals.  Some details of the model and the ways it is used are open to 
criticism (see e.g. Gasper, 1989); but those require a separate discussion. For our present 
purposes the model valuably suggests the scope for ordering and systematizing normative 
policy arguments, and is becoming quite widely used.   
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BOX 1 -  Fischer's model of the levels of policy evaluation 
 
I have paraphrased Fischer (1980:206-12).  The comments in brackets are 
Fischer's on how to tackle the questions. 
 
Level 1 (Technical verification of program objectives):- 
1)Program Objectives - Is the program objective logically derived from the 
relevant policy goals?  (Refer to logical rules.) 
2)Empirical Consequences - Does the program empirically fulfil its stated 
objectives?  (Refer to empirical knowledge of consequences.) 
3)Unanticipated Effects - Does the empirical analysis uncover secondary effects 
that offset the program objectives?  (Refer to knowledge of 
consequences.) 
4)Alternative Means - Does the program fulfill the objectives more efficiently 
than alternative means available?  (Refer to knowledge of alternative 
means.) 
 
Level 2 (Situational validation of policy goals):- 
5)Relevance - Are the policy goals relevant?  Can they be justified by appeal to 
higher principles or established causal knowledge?  (Refer to knowledge 
of established norms and to causal conditions and laws.) 
6)Situational Context - Are there any circumstances in the situation which 
require that an exception be made to the policy goal or criterion?  (Refer 
to particular facts of the situation.) 
7)Multiple goals - Are two or more goals equally relevant to the situation?  (Refer 
to normative logic.) 
8)Precedence - Does the decision-maker's value system place higher precedence 
on one of the conflicting criteria?  Or does it lead to some contradictory 
prescriptions?  (Refer to normative logic.) 
 
Level 3 (Vindication of political choice):- 
9)System Consequences - comparison of goal-system's consequences with 
accepted social ideals in the situation.  (Refer to causal conditions and 
laws.) 
10)Equity.  (Refer to normative logic and accepted social ideals.) 
11)Ideological conflict.  (Ditto.) 
For questions 10 & 11, there should be discussion of how far the policy's goals 
and the supporting social ideals are compatible with equitable resolution 
of conflicts. 
 
Level 4 (Choice of Social Order):- 
12)Alternative Social Orders - comparison with alternative social orders, if 10 & 
11 so imply.  (Refer to knowledge of fundamental needs and to 
normative logic.) 
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 Fischer's model was devised more for assessment than for description, and so we look at 
it further later.  However, checklists of elements or issues that policy arguments should cover 
can help us also in description, for they give questions with which to probe what is covered in 
an argument and what not.  (Hoppe has used Fischer's model in this way.)  They similarly 
help us in generating propositions.  The Fischer-Taylor approach of distinguishing broad levels 
helps in describing the levels of normative backing to an argument, systems of grounding 
propositions, and the worldviews and `paradigms' used in different policy stances.  
 The Fischer model provides more questions than does the LFA.  It bears a superficial 
similarity to LFA, for the prevalent USAID version of LFA also contains four levels.  However 
the top two USAID levels seem to roughly correspond to the bottom two Fischer levels:- 
 
FISCHER USAID 
Higher principles  
Predominant social ideals  
Policy goals Goal 
Programme objective Purpose 
 Outputs 
 Inputs 
 
So Fischer's model is stronger for probing the Goal level and beyond, and LFA for levels of 
Purpose and below.  This is consistent with the acknowledged weakness around Goal level in 
the use of LFA (Cracknell & Rednall, 1986).  The use of four levels in both cases probably 
reflects the attraction of four as a reasonable balance between on one hand (i) complexity and 
highlighting of layers and interconnections, and on the other hand (ii) simplicity and 
manageability, especially for large-scale use.  Dividing a programme into four (or five) levels 
is usually a simplification; correspondingly in practice the dividing lines between levels are 
often left unclear.vi 
 How can one counter the real danger that, once people have learnt an approach, they 
will insist on `finding' examples of its categories in every argument, and only those categories? 
 And for example, in use of the LFA, insist on identifying a project's means-ends chain(s) as 
three (or four if they have been taught the German version), regardless of the specifics of the 
case; or, because only one slot is provided in a diagram, identify only one Purpose or Output 
when there are several. 
 I suggest that a picture of imputable sequences of argument in actual project and policy 
analyses makes a useful complement.  The idea is to minimize leading people to preset 
answers, and to emphasize the creative and variable stages of formulation and final synthesis, 
which can produce a range of structures and tactics.  Hopefully this picture balances 
specificity (and hence practical usefulness) with generality (and so a wide range of 
application).   
 Here is a set of activities into which one can analyze the contents,  explicit and implicit, 
of appraisal and evaluation arguments: 
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1. Formulation and framing 
   1a - definition of the exact type of assessment question asked 
   1b - interpretation of key terms and categories 
   1c - defining the scope of materials to which the question is 
   put (this involves further questions about alternatives, 
   constraints, boundaries) 
2. Objectives and criteria 
   2a - specification of objectives and criteria 
   2b - justification of them (but the presence and form of this 
  stage depend on 1a above) 
3. Data collection: on outcomes, etc. 
4. Data analysis and interpretation. 
5. Synthesis 
   5a - partial synthesis; as in making predictions, or interpret- 
 ing what are costs and benefits; etc. 
   5b - full synthesis: evaluation, prescription, conclusion. 
 
The stress on formulation and synthesis is seen by the first and last stages, which we will 
examine in Sections 4 and 5 below.  Much under Hambrick's propositions on grounding, 
constraints and alternatives corresponds to `formulation'.  There is little in his schema to 
match `synthesis'.  Yet policy conclusions generally do not follow simply or unequivocally 
from the materials mustered in their support; further stages of interpretation and judgement 
are required.   
 The set of stages above can be useful in both analysing and improving arguments.  It is 
not a necessary sequence for actually constructing, specifying or assessing positions; those 
sequences could well be more complicated.vii  It is more a format for grouping the multiple 
strands and clusters that argument analysis will reveal, or that brainstorming produces.  (See 
Apthorpe & Gasper, 1982, with reference to evaluations of service cooperatives in developing 
countries).  The stages cited are interactive; for instance, definition of scope and specification 
of objectives affect each other.  Which stages are worth distinguishing depends on the case; for 
example, interpretation of what are costs and benefits can be sufficiently creative to deserve 
separate attention.  (See Gasper, 1987, on project analyses.)  
 One should look broadly at a position in and across its stages, not only at isolated 
statements.  Specifications of positions can reflect an approach to their assessment, e.g. a 
predisposition to defend or condemn (see my paper on essentialism, later in this collection).  
Scriven argues that one should lean toward charitable interpretations and hence more 
defensible specifications.  This gives priority to developing knowledge rather than to 
criticising as an end in itself.  Attacks on weaker specifications of arguments are also more 
easily dismissed. 
 In this section I have argued that Toulmin's popular format is not enough to show the 
mechanics of policy argumentation.  We need too the more open-ended exploratory methods 
of Scriven and others, to look at individual cases and patterns; and more reference to the 
specifics of policy, where Pen and others offer lists of typical components.  I have extended 
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Hambrick's work into a sketch of how components fit into an overall policy argument; and 
compared this with the `logical framework' approach and Fischer's model.  The three have 
different emphases and can be seen as complementary.   
 In all of these cases there remains the danger that approaches devised to help us think 
more carefully will lull us into not thinking.  I have therefore added a complementary sketch 
of an imputable set of activities in evaluation arguments, with emphasis on how positions are 
framed and synthesized from available materials.  It directs attention to key issues rather than 
relying on a fixed format that may be thoughtlessly imitated.  The next two sections look 
further at this framing and synthesis.   
 
4.  Formulation and framing 
 
 Policy argument includes as intersecting activities the framing of techniques and the 
application of social philosophies (Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963; MacIntyre, 1977).  We see 
that clearly in Fischer's schema.  Techniques can only operate within a frame of assumptions; 
and on the other hand, general principles only become operational through many technical 
steps.  This intersection needs to be handled in an orderly consistent way.  Policy argument 
analysis tries to unravel the linkages involved.  Important issues can otherwise fall neglected 
between the disciplinary stools of the social scientist and the social philosopher, and 
sophisticated lower-level materials and higher-level philosophies can be sloppily combined.  
 Rein's influential discussions of `framing' in policy analysis take `frame' as a 
comprehensive category, like `paradigm' in its `disciplinary-matrix' sense, i.e. the core set of 
shared ideas on which the work of a group is based.viii  While examining such paradigms has 
become common in universities, `the university environment and culture... has the tendency 
of driving [such] inquiry into a metalevel where the philosophical assumptions ... [are] 
examined... and runs the risk of deepening the separation between thought and action' (Rein, 
1983:106). 
 I will therefore highlight aspects of argument framing which have an active and 
practical nature: matters of inclusion, exclusion and attention, including how the burden of 
proof is distributed, and the perception of alternatives and constraints.  There is a case for 
limiting the word `framing' to these areas, to help differentiate terms.  We earlier used 
`formulation' as label for a broader concept.  The more limited meaning seems better fitted too 
to the root metaphor for framing that Rein employs -- that of visual perspective (1983:96-7) -- 
than is a sense that covers every aspect of one's approach. 
 Since choice of broad theoretical/policy paradigm does not settle all other choices, one 
can highlight these overlapping component areas in formulation: (a) the choice of purpose and 
standpoint of an argument; (b) the above sense of `framing'; (c) choice of terms and categories, 
and (d) the key images and metaphors used.  The first concerns for example at what level of a 
`logical framework' one is presently arguing, and why; who is the client/audience, and what 
is the context.  It is now relatively familiar, as are issues of paradigm choice.  Choice of key 
images (such as `growth pole') has also been well treated (e.g. Rein & Schon, 1977; McCloskey, 
1985).  Here I will look instead at framing and the boundaries adopted in analysis.   
 Policy analysts do well to consider the following seven connected aspects of framing when 
they examine a policy position, more than how to fit it into the categories of say speech-act 
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theory or classical or modern rhetoric.  The seven concern the sort of often unstated 
assumptions that were referred to in Scriven's checklist.  Limits of space preclude extended 
examples. 
 (1)  In tracing and weighing of effects, issues of time horizons and discount rates have 
become prominent, thanks to environmentalists' attack on the valuations in mainstream 
economics (see e.g. Goodin, 1982).  The issues are vital because, to exaggerate only slightly, 
`any argument can be turned to any effect by juggling with the time scale' (Elster, 1984:34).  All 
institutions and movements argue for example that bad short-term effects will be outweighed 
by longterm improvements.  In the extreme, a supposedly `infinitely' better future justifies 
anything that furthers its eventual attainment.  At the other extreme, use of a high discount 
rate may in effect render the longterm future of no importance. 
 (2)  The overall issue of the proper scope of analyses has been considered in planning 
theory's debates about comprehensive versus bounded rationality, the range of factors to 
include in project analyses, and so on.  Where in open systems should one draw the 
boundaries of analysis?  Matters of scope in identifying causes link closely to choices of level of 
analysis and of broad policy paradigm.  Some types of possible effect are often ignored if it is 
believed that all options can equally plausibly claim them, or that action on such matters is 
better assigned to other policies.  On the other hand, Hirschman (1967) noted that while 
analysis cannot go on forever, it must consider those `side effects' of projects, such as impacts 
on self reliance, management capacity, commitment and adaptability, which are in fact vital in 
their future operation. 
 Also enlightening here is work by historians conscious of the necessity of selection in 
their accounts and analyses, and of corresponding criteria.  Some connections are traced, not 
others; some contributory factors are highlighted as causes, not others.  The issue is not that 
this is done - for neither causes nor effects can be traced in totality or without end - but how 
consistently and defensibly (Stretton, 1969).  The convenience of an author, rather than his or 
her special insight, may underlie claims of necessary bounds to the argument, as signalled by 
`in the final analysis' and similar phrases.  These require probing to see if they have more 
content than just `where I want to stop (or happen to have stopped) the analysis'. 
 Critics of foreign aid from both Right and Left have insisted that aid be seen as 
contributing to a wider system, which they respectively identify as public sector socialism or 
dependent capitalism; and they then simply assess aid by assessing that system.  Whereas 
liberals who have sought to identify precise project impacts are faced with problems such as 
that aid flows can release domestic resources for other uses which are very hard to identify.  
They sometimes concluded (e.g. Wood & Morton, 1977) that evaluation is an unending task, 
with rapidly diminishing returns.  The greater the scope in any policy analysis, the greater 
often is the indeterminateness.  The need then is for defensible principles of delimitation.  
These can be legal, political, ethical, administrative, economic, and procedural-
methodological.  And this is the heart of policy analysis (Self, 1975).   
 (3)  Focussing includes distribution of the burden of proof.  Has a policy or a danger to be 
sufficiently proved or sufficiently disproved?  What is the balance adopted between the risks 
of Type I and Type II errors? (i.e. the risks of rejecting a true claim / good proposal, and of 
accepting a false claim / bad proposal; Gasper, 1987).  Similarly, why are certain things taken 
as not needing explanation, as being `normal' or `natural' or so on?   
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 (4)  These designations of a `base case' are of special interest in valuative argument: what 
is the baseline against which something is judged positive or negative, an improvement or a 
retrogression? It is a commonplace that revolutions are more likely after an earlier period of 
improvement, just as loneliness can become intolerable after a taste of contact.  Conflicts often 
involve different views over how things would be in the absence of the feature that is in 
dispute, and these typically depend much on conceptions of how things could and should be.ix  
In investment analysis for example, the specification of the `without-project' case is generally 
more important for the results than are the refinements of cost-benefit analysis that have 
received so much attention from theorists (Stewart, 1978).   
 (5)  Fifthly, we need to ask more generally what comparisons are made.  The conceived 
alternatives often determine the evaluation of a situation.  Thus Bienefeld (1982), when arguing 
how relatively casual some academic assessments of Tanzanian performance have been, drew 
out a variety of tacit or underargued optimistic assumptions used by critics from Left and 
Right on the feasible alternatives that supposedly were available.   
 Struggles to legitimate one base case and set of categories rather than another sometimes 
involve controlled comparisons of the performance of different systems, but with the control 
used to ensure certain conclusions.  The alternative to the inherently efficient and enlightened 
system that the advocate favours is often depicted as a a collage of its bad features, so that it 
can be ruled out from further consideration.  The actual performance of one's preferred system 
can then be more easily defended.  Rulers have a special fondness for TINA, the claim that 
`There Is No Alternative' to their current policy.  TINA is also an assertion about constraints, 
and leads to the Panglossian claim that one is in the best of all possible worlds.   
 (6)  A linked aspect of alternatives concerns the ideas used about the range of means that 
are available and legitimate, and how they work.  In practice `policies in taxation, welfare, 
subsidization and so forth... [operate in ways that are] complex, unintended, hard to alter' 
(Schaffer & Lamb, 1981:75-6).  Past disputes in cost-benefit theory thus often centred --
implicitly-- on what are the constraints in using the other policy tools: which variables are 
manipulable and which must be accepted as given (Fitzgerald, 1978).   
 (7)  Layard (1972) has suggested more generally that underlying most normative 
disputes is the question of which factors are to be taken as given, as constraints.  Definition of 
constraints is thus the other crucial face of framing.  The answers necessarily reflect both 
theories and values, for to call something a constraint means claiming that there is an 
unsatisfactory rate-of-return from trying to change it; and so they are often controversial.  
Compared to the project level, some argue that at broad policy levels the criteria of (economic) 
efficiency and optimization become more obscure and potentially misleading, and constraints 
more numerous, so that analysis can usefully center on them (Majone, 1975; Seers, 1983).  Neo-
liberals have instead believed they can define, and enforce, efficiency economy-wide, nation-
wide, and world-wide (see Gore in this collection).x 
 One needs to be suspicious of alleged constraints; but assertions, or presumptions, of 
absence of constraint must be treated sceptically too (Goodin, 1977; Gasper, 1987).  The 
allegations are likely to be emphatic, in an attempt to avoid debate.  `The government of India, 
for example, simply cannot command the resources that would guarantee each one of [the] 
inhabitants of India a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and 
his family [sic]' (Cranston, 1973:67; my emphasis).  Yet the governments of Sri Lanka and 
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China can substantially do it.  As Bentham noted, `the plea of impossibility offers itself at 
every step, in justification of injustice'.   
  Having noted in sections 3 and 4 some key structural elements, we can turn more to 
how they link up in arguments.  Just as the scope of policy argumentation means we must 
study its framing, so when we look at extended discourses we must consider overall texturing 
and pattern, not just the strength of individual links.xi 
 
5.  Style, story-telling, and colligation 
 
 One can investigate `style' in various ways.  Sillince (1986) tries to identify language 
forms corresponding to different policy contexts.  He discusses four language styles he sees in 
urban and regional planning: hortatory, administrative, legal, and bargaining.  It is useful too 
to simply list various stylistic devices, for sensitization rather than memorization.  McCloskey 
(1985) and others give illustrations, and government plans are a rich source. (See Box 2.)  
George (1990) shows some distorting devices used to present `Government as Intrusive Alien' 
and `Taxes as Burdensome Impositions' in many of the most used introductory American 
economics textbooks; the cases hinge on the `details' of choice of terms and choice of 
comparisons. 
 Of special interest are the devices by which authors rule out certain things as needing to 
be discussed or taken further.  Exclusion can be tacit, or by invoking precedents, authority, 
`likeliness', `obviousness', or so on.  Exclusion is part of framing, but is especially marked in 
the concluding stages of extended arguments, when authors may be in a hurry to arrive at 
BOX 2:  PURPOSEFUL TALK - THE BOTSWANA TRIBAL GRAZING LAND POLICY 
 `Efforts will be made to develop means for the progressive restriction of 
TGLP herds to their ranches' - i.e. for enforcement of a longstanding legal 
condition in the ranch-leases - says the sixth National Plan for Botswana (1985: 
para.4.65).  We can break this sentence into three parts:- 
 1.  Efforts will be made 
 2.  to develop means 
 3.  for the progressive restriction of... 
Each part contains words of action, and the overall effect is thus one of 
purposefulness.  (Mention of the past non-implementation of legal requirements 
is left until later.) 
 But suppose we remove the first part of the sentence, to leave something 
like `Means will be developed for the progressive restriction of TGLP herds...'  
Interestingly, the result now seems more purposeful, not less.  Alternatively we 
could remove the second part, which gives us `Efforts will be made to 
progressively restrict..'  Finally, suppose we remove both the first and second 
parts, and just say `TGLP herds will be progressively restricted to their ranches 
[as required by law]...'  There are now fewer purposeful words and yet a more 
powerful meaning.   
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claims.   
 The project of McCloskey and others to identify the forms of `the rhetoric of the human 
sciences' (Nelson et al, eds. 1987) has encountered some resistance, not least the belief that it is 
`merely looking at style'.  But the way the components of an argument are selected and 
handled is both style and substance of the argument.  If one does distinguish, then McCloskey 
suggests that we see style as `the details of substance' rather than as surface ornament 
(1988:286).  Until recently their research project has not given much attention to the 
organization of positions in policy-oriented argumentation (though see Throgmorton, 1991).xii 
 So in the previous sections, especially that on formulation, I have highlighted some major 
`details' of the substance of policy argumentation. 
 Two further important lines are the work on `colligation' and `storytelling'.  Practical 
argument often involves synthesis of judgements from a variety of experiences and of types of 
argument.  The latter type of synthesis is especially common in policy, since one must relate 
disparate sets of ideas (economic, sociological, political, administrative).  Colligation refers to 
the construction of overall arguments, where one has `to connect or link together, tie, join, to 
relate (isolated facts, observations etc.) by a general hypothesis' (Collins Dictionary).  It `is 
ubiquitous...because only [so] can one tie... research to the uses to which [social science] is put' 
(Ward, 1972:181).  In policy argument it involves further layers, with the use of ideas about 
purposes and values, as implied in Pen's ugly label, `normative super-colligation'.   
 The term `storytelling' likewise conveys the need for selection and construction from 
what materials are actually available (rather than just hoped for).  Unfortunately its 
connotations of narrative sequence, and of casualness or even deception, make it controversial 
as a general label.  We refer here though to the sort of disciplined interpretive description 
practiced by the good historian.  (In contrast, mathematical economists' `stories' are often 
fables.)  Explaining actions requires relating them to contexts which can never be fully or non-
interpretively described.  These inevitably partial explanations are colligated into an overall 
account of behaviour.  Story-telling is then not just one more phase or technique, but the 
purposeful knitting together and application of all the relevant phases and techniques, 
including resolving disputes between them.  Besides being used to understand past events, 
and in scenarios of possible future implementation problems, narratives can help in coming to 
agreed policy proposals (Kaplan, 1986).xiii 
 Analysis of the available `stories' in a particular case involves analysing arguments by 
means such as we mentioned earlier, and something more.  Criticism and improvement of 
`story-telling' require awareness that selections, and hence criteria of selection, are inevitable 
and may need to be clarified; and likewise for the stitching together of incomplete materials 
into conclusions.   
 `Storytelling' is empirical, for without information there is little to select or stitch.  
Unfortunately the term has obscured this to some.  Several commentators have been enraged 
into inattention, as are others by McCloskey's use of the word `rhetoric'.xiv  Many authors have 
presented ways of countering the dangers and for assessing `stories' (e.g. Ward, 1972; Rein & 
Schon, 1977; Wilber, 1978; Kaplan, 1986).  The criteria in their lists are largely familiar - for 
example Kaplan speaks of truth, richness, consistency, congruency and unityxv; though not all 
the criteria (e.g. fertility, elegance, consistency with felt convictions and expert belief) are part 
of older philosophy of science, and they are often overlooked in the enraged attacks that allege 
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rejection of all criteria.  Kaplan and others instead propose to make our actual practice of 
argumentation more explicit and systematic.   
 
6.  Argument assessment 
 
Aspects of assessment have emerged in earlier sections.  Much follows directly from careful 
argument specification: e.g. seeing how far terms are used consistently, or what alternatives 
have been considered.  Often one may take it as a compliment to be told one has `only' 
identified `simple' errors; for in reality, inconsistencies and failings can involve elements 
which are spread wide and deep within positions, amongst thousands of words, not already 
collated and displayed.  All errors appear simple when broken into steps, but the 
identification may be far from simple; having some methods is important.  Flawed policy 
arguments are not in general knowingly constructed and then defended; instead, appealing or 
convenient arguments are defended, and then need to be deconstructed. 
 Corresponding to universal criteria of assessment are standard lists of fallacies.  Toulmin 
et al (1979:158-185), following Aristotle, distinguish `fallacies of ambiguity', which trade on 
obscurity in key terms; and `fallacies of unwarranted assumptions' or unwarranted inferences, 
which involve inconsistency with rules of logic or accepted facts or other premises.  Thouless 
(1974) and others provide similar compilations.  It is not sufficient, nor indispensable, to study 
such lists; much of the important pitfall orientation is subject-specific.  But they help, as much 
to increase alertness as to provide specific tools.  Toulmin for example lists 18 fallacies, with 
some sub-variants, and Thouless gives 38: these are practical lists, neither uselessly vague nor 
immensely academic.  They should be combined with study of subject-specific pitfalls, as in 
Majone's proposal for `craft training' in policy analysis (1989).xvi    
 We noted earlier that the content and character of `grounds' and `warrants' vary 
between fields.  Toulmin concluded that: `all the canons for the criticism and assessment of 
arguments are in practice field-dependent' (1958:38), and illustrated this at length in a later 
textbook.  It can be misplaced, for example, to criticize ethical or policy arguments for not 
being mathematical or natural science arguments.  `Context determines criteria' (Toulmin et al, 
1979:120). 
 Some authors argue that certain criteria are implicit in the (or a) particular context of 
policy argument.  `Political evaluation, as a [specific] subuniverse of evaluative discourse, 
specifies a "point of view"' (Fischer, 1980:113).  There are various interpretations of what this 
entails: for example, reference to `the public interest'; or, according to Anderson (1979), to 
efficiency, justice, and appropriate authority (though the meaning of each is of course open to 
debate).xvii 
 MacRae (1993) offers five worthy though pedestrian criteria for assessing policy 
proposals relative to given goals and values, in other words within a group of like-minded 
people.  Proposals should: (1) not omit reference to relevant valuative criteria; (2) not elevate 
means into ends; (3) compare alternative policies, including the status quo and doing nothing; 
(4) not omit relevant information; and (5) consider relative quantities.  A multi-criteria matrix 
can ensure that the pros and cons of each relevant alternative are considered for each relevant 
criterion.  He also offers a few points, equivalent to pieces of a professional ethics, concerning 
what tactics are unacceptable in debate between groups with different goals, and how to 
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constrain them.  
 The Fischer model (see Box 1 above) shows this layering of types of policy discourse in a 
deeper and clearer way, and much more.  His `A Logic of Policy Questions' (1980:206-212) 
provides a general heuristic for considering how particular families of questions correspond to 
certain levels of the evaluation of policy arguments. (See Box 1 above.)  We noted that some of 
its questions match Hambrick's, but with more probing of normative and grounding 
propositions, and more on warrant-backing hierarchies than in the Toulmin-Dunn model.  It 
gives one serviceable frame for looking at whole positions, not just the mechanics of single 
propositions or proposals.  The `Logic of Policy Questions' is now quite extensively used in 
teaching and research in the Netherlands (see e.g. de Graaf & Hoppe, 1989; Hoppe et al, 1990; 
Hoppe, 1993.)   
 Its emphasis on desirable elements of a policy argument still needs to be complemented 
by methods to identify actual tactics, links and structures, like the formats we saw earlier.  In 
addition, full operational classifications of questions have to be specific to particular policy 
contexts.  Finally, Fischer's framework reflects a certain philosophy of valuation, derived from 
Taylor (1961) and others.  Thus he speaks of `A' rather than `The' logic of policy questions.  By 
going in depth into one widely used philosophy he is able to give more precise, even if not 
universally binding, illustrations of how policy argumentation synthesizes positive and 
normative aspects.xviii 
 After noting criteria of assessment, we must consider practical matters of strategy.  
Outside the closed worlds of mathematics and formal logic, and given the presence of 
multiple criteria which can pull in different directions, assessment is a matter of reasoned 
judgement and not always of decisive demonstration; and what is reasonable generally 
depends on the context.   
 Firstly, since it usually does not suffice to point out an individual fallacy here or there in 
a component argument of a position, Scriven's canons of assessment in section 2 above went 
beyond clarity and consistency, to matters like scope and comparison with other relevant 
arguments.  The criteria for assessing wider story-telling come in here too.  Some 
quantification and weighting of criteria may sometimes be useful as a check, since our 
unaided powers of aggregation tend to be unreliable.  Assessment is not absolute, but can 
clarify differences and their sources, shift balances, and help sift out arguments.   
 Secondly, for real-world debates, where the strands of argument may spread virtually 
without limit, Scriven advised focussing one's energies.  Concentrate on the parts of an 
argument which support the main conclusions, not necessarily on the weakest parts; and 
concentrate on strong variants of positions.  Since positions are frequently underspecified, 
priority should usually go to encouraging their improvement rather than trying to totally tie 
them down for absolute judgement at one moment.  In practice most positions will implicitly 
accept some criticism and an assessment of `could do better', as is seen by their evolving after 
the criticism. 
 Next, immanent criticism is often helpful, using the position's own terms, as opposed to 
transcendent criticism, which draws on clearly external criteria and intellectual resources.  
Immanent criticism works within a position, but does not imply acceptance of the whole 
position.  Positions are layered; parts of them, like methodological criteria, can have priority 
and be used to rule against some other parts.  Also the immanent/ transcendent distinction is 
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not absolute, since positions are usually not sharply defined and bounded.  The layered 
systems have fuzzy bounds.  Positions exist as both (A), the stated representations, and (B), the 
representations' sources, which are somewhat vague, and neither totally stated nor perfectly 
represented by (A).  Appeal to the quasi-internal resources in (B) is an important aspect of 
criticism which aims to persuade (Nussbaum & Sen, 1987; Walzer, 1987).  Whether it is then 
called immanent or transcendent could vary with context.  Scriven's advice was thus to give 
less priority to judging the current representations than to improving their portrayal of their 
sources.  Rigorous criticism is still vital in this, but some of the emotions it arouses might 
thereby be reduced. 
 Fourthly, the debating aspect to assessments is fundamental, as it is for policy 
argumentation itself.  Indeed we saw that debate, in the form of possible rebuttals and 
comparison with alternative views, is integral to all practical argumentation as elucidated by 
Toulmin and Scriven.  Arguments attempt to persuade an audience; they respond, even if 
implicitly, to previously stated views; and their meanings always go beyond the conscious 
control of the author (Throgmorton, 1993).  And assessments of the quality of arguments 
involve interchanges between parties, where `face' can be as important as `faiths'.   
 The selective interchange in debates is potentially a way of concentrating on matters that 
are more important in the given context; but it can also facilitate conflict.  People usually 
cannot resist concentrating on others' peripheral apparent inconsistencies, to imply their own 
superiority, since that is often easier than demonstrating it.  
 Also common are crossed transactions, where responses are directed at implications it is 
feared others might draw from a statement, rather than directed (as in complementary 
transactions) to its actual content. 
 
Examples of complementary transactions: 
 Stimulus - co-operatives aren't suitable in cases A to H. 
Responses - (i) I agree; (ii) I don't agree; (iii) I agree for cases A to D, but not for cases E to H; (iv) 
for reasons x,y, and z, I think you should review your arguments and criteria. 
 
Examples of crossed transactions: 
 Stimulus - co-operatives aren't suitable in cases A to H. 
Responses - (i) co-operatives aren't to blame for lack of suitability; (ii) I deny that co-operatives are 
a flawed and inferior form of organization; (iii) so you reject co-operatives.  (See Apthorpe 
& Gasper, 1982.) 
 
 Many a time, transactions reinforce differences rather than reduce them; so some policy 
analysis techniques keep parties out of direct contact, to reduce the peripheral conflicts.  The 
above set of crossed responses is prone to be followed by `you renegade', and more.  Provoked 
by the tactics and tone of debates around evaluations of formal rural service co-operatives in 
India, Baviskar & George (1988) provided a thoughtful set of suggestions on controversy 
management.  Debates around other policies and organizations are equally heated and in need 
of help. 
 Finally, assessors must not be surprised by the apparent persistence of identified 
fallacies, nor by the denial of change even if and when fallacies are abandoned.  On one 
occasion one thing is said, on another something evidently inconsistent; but the two may have 
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a common inspiration: a belief in the essential desirability of the policy being discussed, and a 
common effect - namely, its vindication.  Even a feeling of consistency may then be retained.  
In the short run, the `open texture' of conceptsxix may help cover inconsistencies and defence 
of idealized essences; but in the longer run it can provide a yet more valuable service.  For 
when adaptation is felt advisable, open texture eases an evolution under cover of claiming - 
indeed perhaps still comfortingly feeling - that one's essential position has not changed, even 
though by operational tests one's effective position clearly has.  `But of course we have always 
believed in [our new position]'. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
 I have presented argumentation in policy analysis and planning as selective and 
creative.  So I have tried to outline an active flexible approach in argument analysis: not a 
grand theory but some usable themes and methods that should help to draw forth skills, not 
depress them under a supposedly total map of policy argumentation.  The approach aims to 
be flexible where there can be differences in structure and elements between cases; but to 
stress issues in `opening' and `closing' which arise in every case. I have tried too to present 
argument specification and assessment in a broader context, to help in identification, 
generation and improvement of arguments, not just the examination of given and fixed 
positions. 
 In a complex field, none of the methods mentioned, nor others, nor all put together, will 
guarantee correct or insightful analyses; and they may be misused.  But in general they should 
help.  Many can be viewed as like the aids one uses when learning a language or some other 
skill.  Once one has mastered such aids, one can go on to more novel tasks and refer back only 
occasionally. 
 My concern has been to introduce modest but helpful tools.  There is little point in 
asking most policy analysts to master the latest models from speech-act theory or wherever, 
elaborated without reference to the specifics of their field.  We need instead to mobilize and 
complement their `trade'-skills.  With students too, we should foster skills that will help them 
to grapple with cases by themselves, during their courses and later.  While the literature on 
policy argumentation has more to offer (see e.g. Fischer & Forester, eds. 1993), I have 
considered that one priority is to present a practical approach to analysing arguments.  The 
second priority has been to highlight a few important issue clusters that can be vividly 
conveyed in teaching.  A kit of `watch-out-fors' and `think-carefully-abouts' should 
supplement the standard tools.  Argument analysis must include sensitivity both to use of 
language and to wider structures.  The issue cluster of framing was accordingly emphasized.  
There and elsewhere, policy argument analysis can and should give attention both to broad 
conceptions and precise details; and, vitally, show how those conceptions are realized through 
the mere `details' of argument.  
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ii. Toulmin has said he would, if now rewriting `The Uses of Argument', stress further how the very 
substance of the things at stake varies between fields, and hence how each field is distinctive (Toulmin, 
1990). 
iii. Goldstein suggests that in utilitarian arguments the grounds include individual preferences, market 
prices, etc.; the warrants are from orthodox welfare economics; and the backing is utilitarian social 
philosophy (with more or less liberal amendment).  In systems arguments, grounds include estimated 
and/or projected system conditions; the warrants are the models used of the system, and the posited 
goals, usually for system maintenance; backed by the associated methodology.  In procedural arguments, 
the grounds are facts about the procedure by which a conclusion was reached (e.g. majority voting held 
under certain conditions); the warrant is a purported principle of good procedure; and the backing is a 
supportive social philosophy.  He noted too the prominence of qualifiers and rebuttals in policy and 
planning arguments, given our limited theories, orientation to an uncertain future, and typical need to 
act before research can fully mature. 
iv. Figure 2 already refines the schema by noting that there can be a rebuttal not only to a warrant but 
also to a backing.  
v. See e.g. Cracknell & Rednall, 1986; Wiggins & Shields, 1995.  Location of the assumptions column at 
the far right of the logical framework diagram contributes to its neglect, at least in the USAID and related 
versions which place two other columns between the means-ends hierarchy and the associated 
assumptions.  People obliged to fill in a logframe are in addition often exhausted by the time they reach 
this fourth column.  A more sensible location would be directly adjacent to the means-ends hierarchy, on 
its left.  
vi. The orthodox case for standardization, and associated simplification, holds that unless principles of 
analysis are incorporated into compulsory administrative routines, they are unlikely to have widespread 
and sustained impact (e.g. Cracknell & Rednall, 1986).  Bureaucracy favours standardization, for large-
scale use by ordinary staff, and for ease of comparison and central supervision; one's judgement on 
standardization may depend on how much faith one has in people's independent thinking.  The LFA 
also seems more used in aid programmes than in domestically funded programmes in either rich or poor 
countries; the resolution (on paper) of objectives is easier to enforce when the players have such unequal 
power.  
vii.  Thomas (1972) presents a similar picture, and notes that it is a `reconstructed logic'.  He then 
contrasts it with a pragmatic `logic-in-use' for actually making and testing value judgements. 
viii. In fact Kuhn's other, neglected, sense of `paradigm' is equally important here: `exemplar' paradigms 
are concrete instances of exemplary practice, which embody ideas that can be recognized but are not 
easily or satisfactorily formalizable, including ways of `seeing' situations or of deciding which 
formalizations should be applied and how.  The meaning of exemplars is notably open-textured and 
open to evolution (Kuhn, 1977).  Exemplar is not only the older meaning, but not prone to the potential 
danger with the other sense (i.e. a way-of-thinking or disciplinary matrix) of inducing lack of care when 
we examine others' ideas. 
ix.  The choice of base case can be vital in bids to define the term `justice'.  In the classic liberal view of 
Locke, a man has exclusive right to the products of his own labour, including land that he opens up, 
provided that there be `enough and as good left in common for others'.  Many enclosure movements in 
fact reduced the standard of life of those who had benefited from communal rights of access.  Hence 
property holders and their advocates often seek a modified reading of Locke's proviso.  The relevant 
baseline for those who are excluded by the privatization of common property is taken as their well-being 
in an original `state-of-nature', in which resources were not scarce but where living standards were 
conveniently low.  It is easier to defend privatization when `the baseline for comparison is so low' 
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(Nozick, 1974:181).  Yet if one argues - as do many defenders of privatization - that the long-run position 
of the excluded be considered, and that short-term losses may be outweighed by longer-term gains, then 
the baseline for the comparison should not be static.  It should be what others' standard of life would be 
over time without the privatization, e.g. with socialization when that has been an historically relevant 
alternative.  The baseline then could well rise over time and not flatter private holding in the way that 
Nozick's argument does (Paul ed., 1982.) 
x. While economists are trained to think of constraints, they can forget even economic constraints, e.g. the 
need for states to raise revenue on a scale beyond the scope of allocatively `neutral' methods.  There are 
also numerous constraints of law and administrative procedure; and political, behavioural and 
administrative capacity limits.  Some development economists find absurd the idea that a government 
could wish to pursue an objective (e.g. redistribution) but be effectively barred from using an available 
means (say taxation; Stewart, 1975); they read this as just a disguised statement of lack of concern, for 
they presume that government is like an individual.  But existing tools may be so burdened with other 
tasks, or so inert and hard to change, that introduction of a new tool (like social cost-benefit analysis in 
investment choice) might enable those using it to advance the objective to some degree. 
xi.  I have not discussed the social framing of argumentation, including selection and grouping of 
participants, a key aspect of argument generation.  Mason & Mitroff (1981) and Fischer & Forester (1993) 
put argument analysis into this perspective. 
xii. For an example of `the new rhetoric' - i.e. an integration of classical rhetoric's study of style with 
analysis of other aspects of argumentation - applied to programme evaluations, see Appendix A of 
House (1980).  Much of the early work on `rhetoric of economics' was on the Keynesian versus 
monetarist versus new classical controversies in macroeconomics (e.g. Klamer, 1984), but emphasised 
rather universally posed policy issues of intervention versus non-intervention and discretion versus 
fixed rules.  Attention to more intricate and substantive policy argumentation becomes unavoidable in 
work on sectors such as health or roads; cf. Colvin (1985).  
xiii. Although often consensus on objectives and criteria is unattainable, agreement on actions is 
sometimes still attainable through composing and scrutinizing a narrative that reviews past experience, 
explains current dilemmas, and presents corresponding proposals.  Value criteria can be left partly 
implicit, just suggested by the account; for the proposals may be compatible with a range of values and 
objectives and hence acceptable to a range of people. 
xiv.  See e.g. reviews of Pen (1985) by Cohen (1986); and by Blaug (1989) of Klamer et al (eds., 1988).  
McCloskey (1994) gives a magisterial rejoinder to his critics. 
xv. Incongruency is when adjacent elements seem to conflict, without adequate explanation being given. 
 Unity means that the sections of a story clearly show their relationship to each other. 
xvi. Sillince (1986) gives examples from planning, for 18 types of fallacy, mostly based on Thouless.  In 
some instances one might query whether the fallacy is well presented, distinct from others, and well 
exemplified, or even whether what is described is always a fallacy.  This is partly inevitable when one 
comes to complex real cases; and it offers an opportunity to engage students, not spoonfeed them.  They 
can also consider what type of fallacy each is: 1. conceptual, 2. inferential; or 3. failure to look at relevant 
factors, 4. introduction of irrelevant factors, or 5. a `Type III error' of addressing the wrong question.  
Dunn (1993b:261) contrasts `first-order errors.. the choice of the less valid of two or more causal 
inferences [e.g. Type I and Type II errors], and `second-order errors.. the selection of the less appropriate 
of two or more world-views, frames of reference, or problem definitions'.  
xvii. Dunn (1981:232-9) has a similar list of criteria, but is non-committal on whether they are obligatory. 
 He also presents extensive sets of more general criteria relevant to knowledge claims, covering (a) types 
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of possible warrant or backing, and (b) types of possible rebuttal (Dunn, 1993b:270-82).  Similarly, Dunn 
(1990) collates a large number of possible weaknesses: the classical fallacies in deduction, plus the 
fallacies possible in asserting causality (standard in discussions of experimental design), plus the sorts of 
`practical' criteria (clarity, scope, etc.) we saw earlier from Scriven.  He does not advance as clearly as 
Fischer does to substantive considerations of what a policy argument should have covered but did not. 
xviii. Taylor's proposal was that testing a normative judgement requires four stages: `verification', 
`validation', `vindication', `rational choice'.  Fischer valuably suggests which types of social science and 
philosophy correspond to the four levels.  It is debatable though to take Taylor's model as a universal 
prescription (let alone description).  It reflects the work in moral philosophy of Kurt Baier, Herbert Feigl, 
and R.M. Hare; and is consistent with a type of rule-consequentialism.  This is why it gives four rather 
than more or less levels.  It fits some socio-cultural-political set-ups and issue areas better than others; 
and `it is possible to have as many forms of policy analysis as there are systems of political thought' 
(Anderson, 1987:26).  Even given its philosophy, the four levels in fact overlap and flow into each other, 
rather than being sharply distinct.  See the appendix to Gasper (1989).  Some applications mainly use just 
two aggregated levels (Hoppe et al, 1990): policy discourse that employs given normative beliefs 
concerning a policy, and discourse concerning those beliefs.   
xix. This means our inability to specify a full and exact set of necessary conditions which together are the 
sufficient condition for use of a term; instead meanings develop in the process of use.  See Gasper on 
essentialism, in this collection. 
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